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REDUCING PATHOLOGICAL STRESS EFFECTS AND INCREASING 
PILOT PERFORMANCE DURING UNEXPECTED IN-FLIGHT EVENTS. 
Wayne L. Martin; Patrick S. Murray; Paul R. Bates 
Griffith University Aerospace Safety Centre, Brisbane, Australia 
 
The inherent reliability of the modern aircraft means pilots rarely experience actual emergencies, 
or novel, unexpected events. When events do occur, increased arousal levels may have 
pathological effects on pilots’ abilities to deal optimally with the situation, leading to increased 
likelihood of undesired aircraft states. Amygdala based appraisals of unexpected events may 
cause over-arousal through lack of expectation, lack of previous experience of such events (either 
directly or vicariously), and through poor individual perceptions of the ability to handle such 
events. Routine discussion of novel or emergency events widens pilots’ event knowledge database 
and raises expectation of event occurrence. Individual perception of efficacy in such events is 
heightened through increased and more readily accessible knowledge, allowing more positive 
appraisals, which reduces arousal level and improves performance. A pilot study using scenario 
based discussion at a New Zealand Airline showed very positive perceptions of utility and 
efficacy and will be discussed. 
 
The ubiquitous reliability of the modern aircraft has added substantial improvements to air safety. 
However, as a result the average pilot rarely experiences real emergencies, or novel, unexpected 
events. While simulator training allows exposure to such events, this happens rarely, perhaps only 
four days per year, with prolonged periods of routine operations out on the line, the norm. While 
older pilots may remember the days when engine failures were not uncommon, the airline pilot of 
today could go through the remainder of their career with some statistical surety of never 
experiencing a major powerplant failure. Engine reliability is such that the prevalence of other 
systems failures or automation related issues are more commonly cited in modern aircraft 
incident and accident statistics. Accidents such as the Air France Flight 447 loss of control over 
the Atlantic (BEA, 2009), the Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 loss of control on approach at 
Amsterdam (The Dutch Safety Board, 2010), and the Qantas A330 incident off Western Australia 
involving a loss of control inflight (ATSB, 2008) are typical recent examples where unexpected 
events resulted in accidents or undesired aircraft states. 
When actual events do occur, increased arousal levels may have pathological effects on pilots’ 
abilities to deal optimally with the situation, leading to an increased likelihood of undesired 
aircraft states. Over-arousal or acute stress has been strongly associated with reduced 
performance (Stokes and Kite, 1994) with Amygdala based appraisals of unexpected events at 
times causing over-arousal through lack of expectation, lack of previous experience of such 
events (either directly or vicariously), and through poor individual perceptions of the ability to 
handle such events. Anything which can be done therefore to reduce stress levels during critical 
events is likely to engender positive effects on performance.  
Routine discussion in the briefing room or the aircraft of novel or emergency events has several 
benefits during subsequent critical incidents. As well as widening pilots’ event knowledge 
database, it raises expectation of event occurrence. Individual perception of self-efficacy in such 
events is heightened through increased and more readily accessible knowledge, allowing more 
challenging, rather than threatening appraisals, and therefore reducing arousal level. A pilot study 
 
 
using scenario based discussion at a New Zealand Airline in 2010 showed very positive 
perceptions of utility and self-efficacy amongst the Pilots who participated.  
Discussion 
Substantial data exists (eg. Boeing, 2010) which suggests that the reliability of modern aircraft, 
coupled with increased flight path awareness tools such as Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning 
Systems (EGPWS), Vertical Situation Displays (VSD), Head Up Displays (HUD), and Electronic 
Flight Bags (EFB), have greatly reduced the number of Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) 
accidents over the last few decades. Coupled with  ubiquitous reliability in modern aircraft 
engines and improved systems, the trend in flight safety is continuing to improve. Regardless of 
these tools and equipment, aircraft still continue to have accidents, with the predominance in the 
statistics suggesting that in-flight loss of control is now the most common cause (Boeing, 2010). 
Of these accidents, humans have continued over the evolution of aviation, to contribute around 
70-80% to contributory causes (O’Hare, Wiggins, Batt, & Morrison, 1994; Wiegmann and 
Shappell, 1999; Yacavone, 1993) and while the technology has morphed over the generations, so 
too has the nature of the human contribution. Typical areas of concern in modern aircraft 
generally include automation management, loss of situational awareness, poor judgement and 
decision making, vigilance issues, complacency, spatial disorientation, and physical factors. 
While these issues have always been contributory, the very nature of the modern airliner, with its 
automation, reliability, and endurance, has made some of these more of an issue than was 
previously the case. 
 
The level of pilot performance during unexpected, novel, or emergency events varies widely. In 
some, well documented cases, such as those on American Airlines Flight 1592 which ditched in 
the Hudson river in New York (NTSB, 2009), the British Airways Flight 009 which lost all four 
engines in a volcanic ash encounter in Indonesia (UK AAIB, 1982), or those on United Airlines 
Flight 811 which made an emergency landing following a cargo door failure (NTSB, 1992), the 
pilots performed exceptionally well, both individually and as a crew. In other cases however, 
pilot performance has been badly affected by startle and/or acute stress effects resulting in 
undesirable aircraft states or even accidents. Recent examples include the Turkish Airlines Flight 
1951 accident at Amsterdam (The Dutch Safety Board, 2009), and the Air France Flight 447 
which crashed in the Atlantic, where the pilots failed to recover from what appear to be fairly 
recoverable situations following unexpected events. 
Stress and under-performance are likely where pilots have never considered how to deal with a 
situation before (Hancock & Szalma, 2008). Generating a solution to a problem and putting into 
effect a strategy for dealing with it are much harder from scratch, particularly under the effects of 
acute stress. Having a stored plan for dealing with a range of novel events, allows individuals to 
simply recall these strategies and apply them to the situation at hand; a much simpler task under 
stress. These “cognitive pre-plans” may simply be management strategies which can be applied to 
a number of conceivable events. 
Startle is a phenomenon which affects all humans and most animals, and varies in its intensity 
depending on individual susceptibility and expectation levels (Muto and Wierville, 1982; 
Warrick, Kibler & Topmiller,1965). Research has shown that startle can affect information 
processing for up to 30 seconds (Thackray, 1988; Vlasak, 1969; Woodhead 1959, 1969), which in 
a dynamic, complex situation such as an unexpected novel or emergency event, can have 
substantial effects on situation outcome. It is likely that these effects are generated not from the 
initial involuntary startle reflex effects (such as eyeblink and aversive movement), but rather from 
an amygdala based activation of the sympathetic nervous system which may accompany it, which 
 
 
is epitomised by the “fight or flight” reaction (Canon, 1929). Unfortunately there is little that can 
be done to overcome these phenomena other than to raise expectation levels through conditioning 
(Roberts, 2003), and greater exposure to such events which creates “previous experience” and a 
sense of self-efficacy which will reduce sympathetic nervous system arousal levels. 
Acute stress caused by over-arousal can have significant effects on situation outcome, with 
emotion-focussed coping mechanisms such as freezing or denial having potentially disastrous 
consequences. Stress occurs when individuals appraise a situation as potentially harmful and that 
they are insufficiently equipped to deal with it. Primary appraisal is the amygdala based 
assessment process which determines whether a stimulus is benign/positive or involves loss, 
harm, threat or challenge. Secondary appraisal determines the best method of coping with threats 
and is generally dealt with in two ways: problem-focussed coping, in which the individual deals 
with the problem, and emotion-focussed coping which simply changes the individual’s 
relationship to the problem (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Monat & Lazarus, 1991). Of these, 
emotion-focussed coping may use problematic methods such as freezing or denial, and will likely 
therefore have negative implications for situation outcome. The following diagram is proposed to 
show the relationship between appraisal and information processing: 
 
 
Figure 1. A Conceptual Model of Appraisal and Information Processing 
(Martin, Murray & Bates, 2010) 
 
 
A pilot study was carried out in 2010 at a New Zealand based international airline (Martin, 
Murray & Bates, in press). The project was entitled “What would you do if....?” and involved ten 
weeks of trial followed by a short survey. During the trial pilots were encouraged to spend a few 
minutes enroute each day discussing novel events and emergencies, considering how they would 
handle the aircraft, what they would do in terms of diversions, checklists and communications, 
and what best resources to utilise to deal with the problem. Following the trial a survey was 
conducted which analysed the sense of utility and self-efficacy for novel events which pilots 
developed during the trial. The following graphs show some of the significant results: 
Question 4: Do you think that these discussions have raised your expectation level for 
surprise events? 
 
Question 6: As a result of these discussions do you think that you would be better prepared 
to handle one of these novel or emergency events if it happened unexpectedly?  
 
(Martin, Murray & Bates, 2011) 
Conclusion 
Reduced expectation of failure and conditioned over-confidence in aircraft reliability are realistic 
consequences of ubiquitous normality in the sophisticated and failure-tolerant aircraft becoming 
more and more prevalent in airline operations. This lack of expectation, coupled with an enduring 
emphasis on traditional failures during training and checking, are having negative effects on 
situation outcomes during unexpected novel or emergency events. 
 
 
Pathological stress effects such as denial and freezing, coupled with over-arousal associated with 
startle or surprise, can be mitigated to some extent by greater levels of expectation, and greater 
pilot self-efficacy for the handling of such events. This expectation and efficacy can be improved 
by organisational and personal interventions which would encourage pilots to discuss novel and 
emergency events during quiet periods enroute, as a means of developing “cognitive pre-plans” 
for dealing with such events. The traditional “What would you do if .... happened?” has 
commonly been used in military transport operations and in airline command training, but has 
been under-utilised in normal line operations. Discussion of novel events allows pilots to form a 
plan for what they would do in a given situation, free of stress and startle effects, which they can 
then store as a series of related processes and strategies for some time in the future. Regular 
revisiting of these strategies allows for consolidation in long-term memory and associations with 
a large range of situations. This in turn allows these strategies to be utilised from memory in the 
event of a novel incident, either directly, or through association with some previously considered 
and similar event. Strong memories in the long-term memory are comparatively more resilient to 
stress effects, and the greater the depth and breadth of previous event “pre-plans” therefore, the 
more seamless utilisation of effective processes and strategies for dealing with such events or 
similar events.  
A pilot study at a New Zealand based international airline found that pilots who participated in 
scenario discussions of novel events generally had raised levels of expectation and a greater sense 
of self-efficacy for dealing with such events. A willingness to continue with scenario discussions 
beyond the study indicates the sense of utility of the discussions which was evident amongst 
participants. 
As evidence based training starts to become more widespread and an acknowledgement of 
changing needs to deal with real world failures in aircraft becomes recognised, the use of scenario 
based discussions to bolster the capabilities of pilots in dealing with unexpected  novel and 
emergency events would seem to be complementary. Further research is warranted. 
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